The subtle relationship between feeling and thinking, affect and cognition has fascinated philosophers and writers since time immemorial, yet, empirical research on this topic was relatively neglected by psychologists until recently. There have been many claims emphasising the beneficial cognitive and behavioural consequences of positive affect. Many recent works suggest that negative affect may also facilitate optimal performance in many situations, consistent with evolutionary theories suggesting the adaptive signalling function of various affective states. This paper reviews traditional and current psychological theories linking affect to social thinking and behaviour. A variety of empirical studies from our laboratory will also be presented, demonstrating that in many situations, negative affect promotes optimal performance in cognitive and social tasks, including tasks such as memory, social judgements, motivation, and strategic interpersonal behaviours. These results will be interpreted in terms of a dual-process theory that predicts that negative affect promotes a more accommodative, vigilant, and externally focused thinking strategy. The relevance of these findings for recent affect-cognition theories will be discussed, and the practical implications of negative affect promoting improved social thinking and performance in a number of applied fields will be considered.
theoretical approaches linking affect to motivation and cognition, before reviewing a number of experiments demonstrating the sometimes beneficial effects of negative affective states for social thinking and behaviour.
Affect, Cognition, and Behaviour
It is the influence of mild mood states rather than distinct emotions that will be of interest here, as moods are more common, more enduring, and typically produce more uniform and reliable cognitive and behavioural consequences than do more context-specific emotions (Forgas, 2002 (Forgas, , 2007 . Moods are low-intensity, diffuse, and relatively enduring affective states without a salient antecedent cause and therefore, little conscious cognitive content. In contrast, emotions are more intense, short-lived, and usually have a definite cause and conscious cognitive content and recruit more conscious and context-dependent responses (Forgas, 1995 (Forgas, , 2002 .
Relatively few early experiments looked directly at affective influences on cognition and behaviour. However, interest in the cognitive and behavioural consequences of affect increased exponentially in recent years. Contemporary theories linking affect to cognition identify two kinds of affective influences: (a) informational or valence effects (such as affect congruence), when an affective state directly influences the valence of information people access and use and (b) processing effects, when affect influences the way information is processed.
Valence Effects
Affect can influence the valence of thinking and behaviour according to two complementary theories, the affect priming, and the affect-as-information (AAI) models. The affect-priming account (Bower, 1981) argues that affect is integrally linked to an associative network of memory representations. Experiencing an affective state may thus selectively prime associated constructs previously linked to that affect, and such affectcongruent ideas are more likely to be used in subsequent constructive cognitive tasks, resulting in a bias towards affectcongruent memories, inferences, and judgements. Numerous studies found that people selectively remember more moodcongruent details from their childhood, and recall more moodcongruent events from the recent past (Bower, 1981) . Mood congruence can also influence how people interpret social behaviours (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984) and form impressions of others (Forgas & Bower, 1987) . However, affect priming is also subject to several boundary conditions, and is most reliably obtained when tasks require open, elaborate, and constructive processing, as is the case with many inferences, associations, impression formation, and interpersonal behaviours (e.g., Forgas, 2002 Forgas, , 2007 Forgas & Eich, 2012) .
A complementary AAI model was proposed by Schwarz and Clore (1988) and Clore, Schwarz, and Conway (1994) suggesting that "rather than computing a judgement on the basis of recalled features of a target, individuals may … ask themselves: 'how do I feel about it?' [and] in doing so, they may mistake feelings due to a pre-existing state as a reaction to the target" (Schwarz, 1990, p. 529) . Thus, people may misattribute a preexisting affective state to an unrelated stimulus. Such affective misattribution is most probable when "the task is of little personal relevance, when little other information is available, when problems are too complex to be solved systematically, and when time or attentional resources are limited" (Fiedler, 2001, p. 175) , as is the case, for example, when people are asked to perform simple, personally uninvolving off-the-cuff judgements (Forgas & Moylan, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) .
Processing Effects
Affect may also influence the process of cognition, that is, how people think (Clark & Isen, 1982; Forgas, 2002; Forgas & Eich, 2012) . A recent and comprehensive explanation for these processing effects by Bless and Fiedler (2006) suggests that different moods have an evolutionary signalling function recruiting qualitatively different processing styles. According to this theory, negative moods call for accommodative, bottom-up processing, focusing attention on the details of the external world. In contrast, positive moods recruit assimilative, top-down processing and greater reliance on pre-existing internal schematic knowledge and heuristics (Bless, 2000; Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001) . This affectively induced assimilative/accommodative processing dichotomy received considerable support in recent years suggesting that moods perform an adaptive function preparing us to respond to different environmental challenges. For example, Fiedler, Asbeck, and Nickel (1991) found that those in a positive mood were more likely to engage in constructive processing and were more influenced by prior priming manipulations when forming judgements about people, while negative mood reduced this tendency. In contrast negative affect, by promoting attention to new external information, can reduce judgemental mistakes (Forgas, 1998a) , reduce halo effects and primacy effects in impression formation (Forgas, 2011a (Forgas, , 2011b , improve the quality and efficacy of communication strategies (Forgas, 2007) , and also improve eyewitness memory (Fiedler et al., 1991; Forgas, Vargas, & Laham, 2005) . The theory thus implies that both positive and negative mood can produce processing advantages albeit in response to different situations that require different strategies. This model explicitly affirms that negative affect does have important adaptive functions, as several of the experiments reviewed here will show.
Integrative Models
Integrative theories such as the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995 Forgas, , 2002 seek to link the informational and processing effects of mood and also specify the circumstances that facilitate or inhibit affective influences on cognition and behaviour. The AIM predicts that affective influences on cognition depend on the processing styles recruited in different situations that can differ in terms of two features: the degree of effort, and the degree of openness of the information search strategy they recruit. By combining processing quantity (effort), and quality (openness, constructiveness), the model identifies four distinct processing styles: direct access processing (low effort, closed, not constructive), motivated processing (high effort, closed, not constructive), heuristic processing (low effort, open, constructive), and substantive processing (high effort, open, constructive) . Affect infusion should be most likely when constructive, substantive, or heuristic processing is adopted. In contrast, affect should not infuse thinking and behaviour when motivated or direct access processing is used.
The following experiments exploring affective influences on cognition typically employ a two-stage procedure. Participants are first induced into a positive or negative mood using films, music, or autobiographic memories. The effects of mood are then explored in subsequent tasks in what is described as a separate, unrelated experiment. Evidence for the potentially adaptive benefits of negative affect will be summarised in four sections, dealing with (a) memory, (b) judgements, (c) motivation, and (d) strategic interpersonal behaviours.
Affective Influences on Memory
Memory-the ability to access previously encoded knowledgeis perhaps the most fundamental cognitive faculty (Forgas & Eich, 2012) . Accurately remembering the past is a difficult and demanding task, such memories can be of crucial importance in everyday life, as well as in forensic and legal practice (Loftus, 1979; Neisser, 1982) . Negative mood, by recruiting a more accommodative and externally focussed processing style, should result in improved memory performance. Eyewitness memory in particular is often distorted by what people pay attention to, as well contamination by subsequent incorrect information (Fiedler et al., 1991; Loftus, 1979; Wells & Loftus, 2003) . In one experiment, we showed participants photos of a car crash scene (negative event) or alternatively, a wedding party scene (positive event; Forgas et al., 2005, Exp. 1) . One hour later, they were induced into happy or sad moods and then received questions about the scenes that either did, or did not contain misleading, false information (e.g., "Did you see the stop sign at the scene?" when there was no stop sign). After a further 45-min interval, eyewitness memory was assessed.
As expected, negative mood reduced, and positive mood increased the tendency to incorporate false, misleading information into eyewitness memories. In fact, negative mood almost completely eliminated the common "misinformation effect" (Loftus, 1979) . A signal detection analysis confirmed that negative mood actually improved the ability to accurately discriminate between correct and false details.
We found a similar pattern in a subsequent experiment, when students witness a staged but highly realistic 5-min altercation between a lecturer, and a female intruder (Forgas et al., 2005, Exp. 2) . Misleading information was introduced 1 week later, when happy and sad eyewitnesses responded to questions about the incident that either did, or did not contain false, planted information (e.g., "Did you see the young woman in a brown jacket?" when the intruder wore a black jacket). We tested eyewitness memory after a further interval and found that those in negative mood while exposed to misleading information were less influenced by the planted details, and retained more accurate eyewitness memory (Figure 1 ), as also confirmed by a signal detection analysis. Interestingly, people seem unable to control this mood effect, even when explicitly instructed to do so according to a third experiment suggesting that negative affect can improve memory performance, consistent with the assimilative/accommodative theory (Fiedler & Bless, 2001; Forgas, 1995 Forgas, , 2002 .
The effects of mood on memory were further confirmed in a realistic field experiment, in a small suburban shop (Forgas, Goldenberg, & Unkelbach, 2009 ). We were curious whether happy and sad people might remember differently a number of small unusual objects (little trinkets, toys, matchbox cars, etc.) we placed near the check-out counter. Mood was induced naturally, by carrying out the experiment on cold, rainy, and unpleasant days (negative affect), or bright, sunny, warm days (pleasant affect; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) . We asked shoppers as they left the shop to try to remember as many of these items as possible. As expected, people in a slightly negative mood (on rainy days) had significantly better memory for the objects they saw in the shop than did happy people questioned on a bright, sunny day ( Figure 2 ). Thus, it seems that mild, natural moods indeed have an effect on memory accuracy, with negative mood improving memory, consistent with the assimilative/ accommodative processing model. 
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Judgemental Effects Mood Effects on the Fundamental Attribution Error
The fundamental attribution error (FAE) refers to the common tendency to infer intentionality and ignore situational causes. Negative affect, by promoting more accommodative processing, should reduce the incidence of the FAE by directing greater attention to external, situational information (Forgas, 1998b) . When happy or sad participants were asked to make inferences about the writer of an essay advocating a popular or unpopular position (for or against nuclear testing) that they believed was either assigned, or was freely chosen (e.g., Jones & Harris, 1967) , negative affect reduced the FAE. This was further confirmed in a follow-up field study. Participants feeling good or bad after seeing happy or sad movies read and made attributions about the writers of popular and unpopular essays (arguing for, or against recycling). Once again, those in a negative mood were less likely to make incorrect, dispositional inferences based on assigned, coerced essays. Further (Forgas, 1998a, Exp. 3), negative mood also improved memory for essay details, consistent with a more accommodative processing style. A mediational analysis confirmed that processing style was a significant mediator of mood effects on judgemental accuracy.
Negative Affect Reduces Halo Effects and Primacy Effects
Halo effects occur because judges tend to assume that a person having some positive features is likely to have others as well. In another experiment, we (Forgas, 2011b) asked happy or sad judges to read a one-page philosophical essay. We also attached a photo of the writer showing either a casually dressed young female, or a tweedy, bespectacled older male, expecting that the appearance of the "writer" should exert a halo effect on judgements. This indeed was the case, but those in a negative mood were much less influenced by the appearance of the writer than were judges in a positive mood. Positive mood in turn magnified halo effects-both the essay, and the writer more positively evaluated when the photo showed a middle-aged male (typical philosopher) rather than a young female (Figure 3 ). Primacy effects occur because people prematurely form a superficial impression based on early details, and fail to process later stimulus information carefully and attentively (Asch, 1946; Luchins, 1958) . As moods can play an important role in triggering qualitatively different processing strategies (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 2002 Forgas, , 2007 , primacy effects should be reduced by the more attentive, accommodative thinking style promoted by negative mood (Forgas, 2011a) . We asked happy and sad participants to form impressions about a target character, Jim described with the order of two paragraphs describing him first as an extrovert and then as an introvert, or in the reverse order (Luchins, 1958) . There was a significant overall primacy effect-but negative mood completely eliminated this common judgemental bias. Conversely, primacy effects were consistently accentuated in a positive mood. (Figure 4 ).
Gullibility and Scepticism
If negative affect promotes attention to stimulus details, it should also improve people's ability to detect deception (e.g., Lane & DePaulo, 1999) . We asked happy or sad participants to detect deception in the videotaped statements of people accused of theft (Forgas & East, 2008b) . Negative affect enhanced judges' ability to correctly discriminate between deceptive and truthful targets according to a signal detection analysis, confirming the beneficial cognitive consequences of mild negative affect (Forgas & East, 2008b; Figure 5) .
Mood may well influence how people perceive and interpret inherently ambiguous interpersonal communications. For example, we found that those in a negative mood were significantly less likely to accept facial expressions as genuine as were people in the neutral or happy conditions. Indeed, negative Forgas, 2011a Forgas, , 2011b Forgas, , 2011c . affect may well function as a general defence against excessive gullibility and increasing scepticism. In one experiment, happy or sad participants judged the likely truth of a number of urban legends and rumours such as "power lines cause leukaemia" or "the CIA murdered Kennedy" (Forgas & East, 2008a) . As expected, negative mood increased scepticism and reduced gullibility for new and unfamiliar claims (Forgas, 2002) . In another experiment, participants were informed about the likely truth of 25 true and 25 false general knowledge trivia statements. Two weeks later, after a mood induction, only participants in a negative mood could correctly distinguish between the true and false claims they had seen previously. Thus, negative mood, by promoting a more accommodative, systematic processing style (Fiedler & Bless, 2001 ) produced a more accurate subsequent discrimination between true and false claims.
Evaluating the truth or falsity of information may also be influenced by subjective ease of processing, or fluency (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Unkelbach, 2006) . Can negative affect reduce the extent to which people rely on heuristic cues, such as fluency in their truth judgements (Koch & Forgas, 2012) ? In this study, after a mood induction, participants judged the truth of 30 ambiguous statements presented with high or low visual fluency (against a high or low contrast background). Judges in a neutral and positive mood rated fluent (presented with high contrast) claims as significantly more true than disfluent claims (presented with low visual contrast; Figure 6 ). However, negative affect completely eliminated this fluency effect, consistent with Bless and Fiedler's (2006) and Fiedler (2001) assimilative/ accommodative processing dichotomy.
Reliance on pre-existing stereotypes may also be constrained by negative mood. In one study, happy or sad people made rapid shoot or do not shoot responses to targets that did, or did not appear to be Muslims. In this "shooter bias" paradigm (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002) , we found a significantly greater tendency overall to shoot at Muslims rather than non-Muslims, but interestingly, negative affect actually reduced this tendency (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008;  Figure 7) . It was positive affect that increased a selective "shoot" bias against Muslims, consistent with more top-down, assimilative 
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Motivational Benefits on Negative Mood
There is a great deal of anecdotal and some scientific evidence suggesting that negative mood may sometimes trigger greater effort than positive affect (Clark & Isen, 1982) . In one experiment, we explored the possibility (Goldenberg & Forgas, 2012) that negative affect should produce beneficial motivational consequences and increase perseverance. If a person is already in a positive affective state, this may result in the discounting of the expected hedonistic value of future success, reducing perseverance (hedonistic discounting). In contrast, negative affect may result in placing greater value on the expected hedonistic benefit of success, improving motivation. In one study, happy or sad participants were allowed to work on a cognitive abilities task as long as they liked. Participants in the positive mood spent significantly less time working on the task compared with those in a negative mood, attempted fewer items, and scored fewer correct answers (Figure 8) . A mediational analyse supported the hedonistic discounting hypothesis, confirming that it was mood-induced differences in task-value beliefs about the value of future success that mediated mood effects on perseverance. Negative affect may also help to eliminate some counterproductive strategies such as self-handicapping (Jones & Berglas, 1978) . In one study (Alter & Forgas, 2007) , we predicted and found that positive mood increases, and negative mood decreases defensive self-handicapping. When participants had reason to doubt their ability to perform well, positive affect significantly increased their defensive tendency to self-handicap (preferring a performance inhibiting drink; Figure 9 ). In contrast, negative affect reduced self-handicapping. Given the pervasive role of affect in achievement outcomes, it is surprising that the influence of moods on perseverance and selfhandicapping received little prior attention. In terms of the hedonistic discounting hypothesis, feeling happy may compromise the desire to work harder to obtain further hedonistic benefits. It now appears that in some circumstances, negative affect may actually deliver greater perseverance and a reduction in dysfunctional self-handicapping behaviours (Alter & Forgas, 2007; Goldenberg & Forgas, 2012) . 
Strategic Interpersonal Behaviours
One of the possible benefits of negative affect may have to do with its interpersonal functions. Evolutionary psychologists, puzzled by the ubiquity of dysphoria, have speculated that negative affect may provide hidden social benefits by possibly arousing interpersonal sympathy, and reducing the likelihood of interpersonal challenges and competition Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) . Many recent works demonstrated a number of further interpersonal benefits. As Homo sapiens is an extremely gregarious species, coordinating our interpersonal strategies presents a demanding cognitive task that requires open, constructive thinking. According to the AIM, affective states should have a mood-congruent influence on many interpersonal behaviours (Forgas, 1995 (Forgas, , 1999a (Forgas, , 1999b . Positive affect may selectively prime more optimistic, positive but also more confident, assertive and sometimes, selfish behaviours. In contrast negative affect should prime more pessimistic, negative interpretations and produce more cautious, polite, and considerate interpersonal strategies (Bower & Forgas, 2001; Forgas, 1995 Forgas, , 2002 .
Thus, in situations calling for self-confidence and assertiveness (such as negotiation, or self-disclosure) positive affect may confer distinct benefits (Forgas, 2002 (Forgas, , 2011c . However, there is growing evidence that in other situations where more cautious, more considerate and less assertive behaviour is appropriate, it may be negative affect that produces real interpersonal benefits.
Language Use
Can temporary negative mood improve people's communication strategies and language use? According to Grice's cooperative principle, conversational utterances should ideally conform to the maxims of quantity, relevance, quality, and manner. In three experiments (Koch, Forgas, & Matovic, 2013) , we predicted and found that participants in a negative mood complied significantly better with Grice's normative maxims than did participants in a positive mood when using natural language to describe previously observed social events (Figure 10) . Experiments 2 and 3 further confirmed that negative mood actually improved the quality of language production, and this effect was not merely due to improvements in the encoding (Exp. 2) and retrieval (Exp. 3) of the relevant information. These findings are consistent with affect-cognition theories predicting that positive affect promotes a more internally focused and assimilative thinking and communication style, and negative mood promotes more externally focused and accommodative thinking, in this instance resulting in the closer observance of communication norms.
These mood effects may apply not only to language production, but negative mood may also improve people's ability to monitor and understand language. Two experiments (Matovic, Koch, & Forgas, 2014 ) explored mood effects on people's ability to correctly identify "bad" sentences that are ambiguous and lack clear meaning in the absence of further contextual information (ambiguous anaphora). We predicted and found that negative affect, induced by film clips, indeed improved people's ability to detect linguistic ambiguity in target sentences ( Figure 11 ).
An analysis of response latencies (Studies 1 and 2) also confirmed that negative mood produced longer and more attentive processing, and a mediational analysis suggested that processing latencies mediated mood effects on detecting linguistic ambiguity. These results are again consistent with negative affect selectively promoting a more concrete, vigilant, and externally focused and accommodative information processing style, producing closer attention to the communicative content of a message.
Request Strategies
Moods may also influence strategic language use such as formulating effective requests. Requesting is a complex interpersonal task that must be formulated with just the right balance between assertiveness versus politeness to maximise compliance without risking giving offence. While positive mood may increase subjective confidence which may produce a more assertive and less polite requesting style, sad mood should lead to more polite and considerate requests (Forgas, 1999a) . We found that when happy or sad, persons were asked to formulate requests in various situations (Forgas, 1999a) , sad persons used more polite while happy participants preferred more assertive and impolite request forms. These mood effects on requesting were magnified by more difficult rather than easy and routine interpersonal situations that required more elaborate, substantive processing.
These mood effects on requesting were also replicated in real-life interactions (Forgas, 1999b, Exp. 2) . Participants who first viewed happy or sad films were asked by the experimenter to get a file from a neighbouring office. When entering the room, their natural requests were surreptitiously recorded; negative mood again resulted in significantly more polite, elaborate, and hedging requests, whereas those in a positive mood used more direct and less polite strategies (Figure 12 ).
Of course, negative affect will not always result in more considerate and effective interpersonal strategies. Several experiments show that in some contexts, positive affect provides clear interpersonal benefits. For example, those in a positive mood tend to be more effective and integrative negotiators (Forgas, 1998a) , tend to respond more positively to requests directed at them in a natural setting (Forgas, 1998b) , are better at managing interpersonal self-disclosure (Forgas, 2011c) , and may be more effective in some organisational situations (Forgas & George, 2001 ). However, these effects are not universal. In some situations where more caution, tact, consideration, and attention to external norms is required, it is negative rather than positive affect that seems to promote more effective interpersonal behaviours.
Interpersonal Fairness
Selfishness versus fairness is a basic dimension when relating to others. Several studies looked at mood effects on the level of selfishness versus fairness people display in strategic interactions such as the dictator game and the ultimatum game. In the dictator game, the allocator has the power to allocate a scarce resource (e.g., money, etc.) between himself and another person in any way they see fit. In the ultimatum game, proposers face a responder who has a veto power to accept or reject the offer. As Bless and Fiedler (2006) suggested, negative affect should promote greater attention and accommodation to the external demands of fairness norms. In contrast, positive affect should recruit a more internally oriented, assimilative processing style, increasing selfishness in allocations.
In several experiments, we found (Tan & Forgas, 2010 ) that happy players were significantly more selfish and kept more resources (e.g., raffle tickets) to themselves than did sad players. The same pattern was confirmed when a series of eight allocations to different partners were analysed: overall, those in a sad mood were again consistently more fair and less selfish and gave more resources to their partner. Further, as the trials progressed, happy individuals actually became more selfish, and sad individuals became more fair (Figure 13 ).
These mood effects on fairness also occurred in the more complex decisional environment faced by players in the ultimatum game, where proposers must necessarily consider the willingness of responders to accept or reject their offers (Forgas & Tan, 2013) . As hypothesised, those in a negative mood were more fair and allocated significantly more resources to others than did happy individuals. These mood effects could be directly linked to differences in processing style, as sad individuals also took significantly longer to make allocation decisions than did happy individuals, consistent with their expected more accommodative and attentive processing style.
How does mood influence responders? In the final experiment, in this series (Forgas & Tan, 2013) , all participants were "randomly" allocated to be responders rather than proposers. Overall, 57% of those in negative mood rejected unfair offers compared with only 45% in the positive condition, consistent with processing theories that predict that negative mood should increase and positive mood reduce attention to external fairness norms even by responders. These results are also in line with recent findings showing that negative mood increases attention to external information (Forgas, 1998a (Forgas, , 1998b (Forgas, , 1999a (Forgas, , 1999b Forgas et al., 2009; Unkelbach et al., 2008) , further challenging the common assumption in much of applied, organisational, clinical, and health psychology that positive affect has universally desirable social and interpersonal consequences.
Persuasion
One of the most ubiquitous influence strategies in everyday life is verbal persuasion. Despite long-standing interest in how persuasive messages are processed by recipients (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) , the question of how affect influences the production of persuasive messages attracted far less attention (but see Bohner & Schwarz, 1993) . In a series of studies, we predicted that accommodative processing promoted by negative affect should result in more concrete, factual, and therefore, more effective and successful persuasive messages (Forgas, 2007) . For example, negative mood participants who were asked to write persuasive arguments for or against an increase in student fees, or Aboriginal land rights produced higher quality arguments (as rated by trained observers) on both issues than did happy participants. A mediational analysis showed that it was moodinduced variations in argument concreteness that influenced argument quality. Negative affect also resulted in better persuasive arguments for or against Australia becoming a republic, and for or against a right-wing party (see Figure 14) , consistent with negative mood promoting a more concrete processing style (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001; Forgas, 2002) . Were these "negative mood" arguments actually also more effective? When the arguments produced by happy or sad participants were presented to naïve undergraduate students, arguments written by negative mood participants were significantly more successful in producing a real change in attitudes than were arguments produced by happy participants. This was also the case when happy or sad participants typed on-line persuasive arguments to a "partner" in what they believed were real interactions. A mediational analysis again confirmed that negative mood induced more accommodative thinking, and more concrete and specific arguments. Managing personal relationships involves a great deal of elaborate strategic information processing, and it is an intriguing possibility that mild negative affect may actually promote a more concrete, accommodative, and ultimately, more successful communication style in many social situations.
Summary and Conclusion
The experiments reviewed here provide convergent evidence that negative affective states can provide distinct adaptive advantages in many everyday social situations. These results are consistent with recent evolutionary theories that suggest that the affective repertoire of human beings has been largely shaped by the functional demands of our ancestral environment, and all of our affective states-including the unpleasant ones-function as "mind modules" and can be shown to produce benefits in some circumstances (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) .
The evidence reviewed here stands in stark contrast with the overwhelming intuitive emphasis on the benefits of positive affect in the recent literature, as well as in popular culture (Forgas & George, 2001) . It is clear that positive affect is not universally desirable: people in a negative mood are less prone to judgemental errors (Forgas, 1998b) , are more resistant to eyewitness distortions (Forgas et al., 2005) , can be more motivated (Goldenberg & Forgas, 2015) , are more sensitive to social norms (Forgas, 1999a (Forgas, , 1999b , and are better at producing high-quality and effective communication strategies (Forgas, 2007; Koch et al., 2013; Matovic et al., 2014) . Given the consistency of the results across a number of different experiments, tasks and mood inductions, these rather counterintuitive effects appear reliable.
Of course, we do not claim that negative affect is always beneficial, or that positive affect does not have adaptive consequences in some settings. Clearly, intense, enduring, and debilitating negative affect such as depression have very negative consequences. We focused here on the cognitive, motivational, and interpersonal consequences of mild, temporary mood states, of the kind that we all regularly experience in everyday life. Our findings are broadly consistent with the notion that over evolutionary time, affective states became adaptive, functional triggers that promote motivational and information processing patterns that are appropriate in a given situation.
The investigations reviewed here have several interesting implications. It would be of considerable importance to pursue and expand this line of research in order to discover the boundary conditions of the cognitive benefits of negative affect. Based on prior work (Forgas & Eich, 2012) , it is reasonably likely that strong pre-existing motivational states may well override the processing consequences of mood states (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996) . The potential processing benefits of more intense emotional states, as distinct from moods, also deserve further inquiry.
The work presented here also has some implications for the practice of psychology. Dealing with negative affectivity is perhaps the most important task of many practicing and applied psychologists. It would be of considerable benefit if training programmes for professional psychologists could include a clearer recognition of the potential benefits of mild negative affective states, as demonstrated here. Given the one-sided cultural emphasis on the ready attainability of enduring happiness, and the preponderance of self-help books promising its achievement, perhaps our cultural views about the human affective repertoire also need to be revised. A wider dissemination of information about the need to accept mild negative moods as a normal part of the human condition could well be helpful to many laypersons who may have formed unreasonable expectations in this regard.
Dealing with the demands of our social environment is necessarily a complex and challenging task that requires a high degree of elaborate processing (Forgas, 1995 (Forgas, , 2002 . The empirical studies presented here suggest that in many situations, negative affect may increase, and positive affect decrease the quality and efficacy of cognitive processes and interpersonal behaviours. Much has been learned about the way affective states influence memory, thinking, and judgements in recent years, yet, not enough is known about the evolutionary mechanisms that are responsible for the way we respond to various affective states.
